AI Agent Incident Log
Daily record of AI agent errors, outages and near-misses at work, and what would have caught them.
Entries before October 2026 were compiled retrospectively from published reports.
We correct entries openly. Each entry has a "Report a correction" link; corrected entries are marked with the date.
Latest entries
Drive deletion incident during project cleanup · data damage
Unnamed: a developer using a coding agent · coding agent · error · data
- What happened
- A coding agent ran a command meant to remove one project folder. The command also targeted the root of the developer’s D: drive; the agent’s vendor said it found the run and confirmed the command’s effect on that path.
- Impact
- A chat-history database, source-code projects and installed applications were lost (reported). Recovery was not reported.
- What would have caught it
- Show the exact deletion targets before a command runs. Require a person to approve any recursive delete that reaches outside the project folder.
- Sources
- Developer’s forum post and vendor reply (source date 2026-10-09)
Stale-file restore incident on a live service · data damage
Unnamed: a developer operating a live service · coding agent · error · data
- What happened
- Asked to revert some privacy-policy wording, a coding agent restored a server file from a two-week-old archive and reported the task as done. The developer said this removed four deployed security fixes (reported) and a moderation API layer; the missing endpoint was noticed two days later.
- Impact
- The fixes were missing from the live service for two days (reported). The developer rebuilt the code from agent session logs; no exploitation was reported.
- What would have caught it
- Show the full file diff and have a person approve it before deployment. Run acceptance checks on existing security fixes and endpoints before a task is marked done.
- Sources
- Developer’s forum post (source date 2026-10-08)
ERP project deletion incident · data damage
Unnamed: a developer working on an ERP project · coding agent · error · data
- What happened
- After the developer approved deleting temporary build files, a coding agent ran a recursive delete command with a wrongly written path. The developer said it removed project source code, Git data, a published build and backups that the cleanup plan had marked to keep.
- Impact
- Six months of engineering work lost (reported). The developer later recovered part of it by decompiling released files.
- What would have caught it
- Show the exact paths and file count, and have a person approve, before any recursive deletion. Keep versioned backups outside the agent’s write access.
- Sources
- Developer’s forum post and follow-up (source date 2026-10-03)
Ticketing-system data exposure incident · data exposure · Named
DIVD · attacker-operated agent · data
- What happened
- DIVD, a Dutch volunteer security organisation, disclosed that an attacker broke into its ticketing system on 21 September, gained root access and then used AI agents for the rest of the intrusion. DIVD bases the agent finding on the volume of actions and on attack scripts whose comments read like agents addressing each other.
- Impact
- User email addresses were taken (reported). DIVD found signs of partial data theft from other operational systems and was still assessing the extent.
- What would have caught it
- Monitor unusual cross-service access and data exports after a host is compromised. Keep sensitive services behind independent access checks.
- Sources
- DIVD incident case file (source date 2026-09-29)
- DIVD data investigation (source date 2026-10-09)
Unapproved production-deployment incident · unapproved action
Unnamed: an operator of a private software service · coding agent · error · cost · near-miss
- What happened
- An issue report written in the agent’s voice and filed from the operator’s account says a coding agent changed production revision settings, added an unintended billable container and left backend containers on different versions. It declared the deployment complete while the frontend still served the old build. The operator also found private infrastructure identifiers in a draft public report before it was submitted.
- Impact
- Two temporary chargeable conditions and a production version mismatch (reported). No bill amount or lasting outage was reported.
- What would have caught it
- Require a person to approve each production configuration change. Check the version running in every intended container before a deployment is marked complete.
- Sources
- Agent-written issue report filed by the operator (source date 2026-09-20)
Coding-workspace upload incident · data exposure · Anonymised
Unnamed: a Chinese AI company · coding agent · data
- What happened
- Developers found that a default-on indexing feature in an AI company's coding tool packaged local workspace files, including repository history, for cloud upload without a clear consent step. The company apologised, disabled the affected features and said uploaded code data had been deleted (reported).
- Impact
- One developer reported a completed 15 KB upload and a larger archive waiting to upload (reported). The number of affected users and any access to the uploaded material have not been made public.
- What would have caught it
- Show the exact files and destination, and require a person’s approval, before any repository-wide upload. Log outbound transfers so they can be audited.
- Sources
- News report (South China Morning Post) (source date 2026-09-20)
- Reuters report (via MarketScreener) (source date 2026-09-21)
Concurrent handover-document incident · data damage
Unnamed: a user running concurrent agent sessions · workflow agent · data · error
- What happened
- A user reported that several concurrent agent sessions overwrote the same handover document three times overnight on 9 to 10 September. Each write reported success while removing material another session had added minutes earlier; a separate content check revealed the loss.
- Impact
- Records of which live sources had been checked were lost (reported). No version history was available to restore the document.
- What would have caught it
- Reject a write when the document has changed since the agent read it. Alert on large drops in document size and keep version history.
- Sources
- User’s issue report (source date 2026-09-10)
Retail intrusion and data damage incident · data exposure
Unnamed: online retailers · attacker-operated agent · data
- What happened
- Security firm Gambit Security reconstructed a campaign in which attackers used AI agents to choose and pursue ways into online retailers’ systems. It recorded a burst of activity from 10 to 15 September and said one agent’s cleanup routine deleted a victim’s backup tables.
- Impact
- Skimmers were ordered against at least 27 named victims and confirmed on 19 during the wider campaign (reported). Across the wider campaign, more than 600,000 payment-card records were taken from two companies (reported).
- What would have caught it
- Alert on rapid probing, unusual access to payment data and changes to storefront scripts. Restrict database deletion rights and keep backups outside the affected system.
- Sources
- Gambit Security investigation (source date 2026-09-22)
Customer photo deletion incident · data damage
Unnamed: e-commerce site · coding agent · data · error
- What happened
- While working on a notification email, a coding agent ran an unrequested deployment command with deletion enabled against the live host, instead of the deployment process it had been given. The site operator said this removed a directory of customer-uploaded photos. The agent also reported a separate deployment as successful when it had not completed.
- Impact
- Permanent loss of the photo directory (reported). A requested feature stayed unfinished for seven days (reported).
- What would have caught it
- Require a person to approve deletion commands against production, with the affected files shown first. Check the deployment system’s actual result before a task is reported complete.
- Sources
- Site operator’s issue report (source date 2026-08-23)
Live page overwrite incident · data damage
Unnamed: multi-project site operator · coding agent · data · cost
- What happened
- A coding agent deployed unrelated changed files along with a requested fix. Later, carrying out an approved request to put up a temporary placeholder, it overwrote five live HTML pages without keeping backup copies.
- Impact
- About 64 hours of uncommitted work permanently lost (reported), plus an unplanned backup subscription of about €100 a year (reported).
- What would have caught it
- Review the deployment file list and differences before publishing. Save recoverable copies of live pages before they are overwritten.
- Sources
- Site operator’s issue report (source date 2026-08-20)
Windows profile deletion incident · data damage
Unnamed: individual developer · coding agent · data
- What happened
- During an automated code audit, a coding agent’s sub-agent ran a PowerShell operation that the developer linked to deletion of their Windows user profile, outside the project folder. The report includes log timings and file-system journal evidence but says the exact command could not be recovered.
- Impact
- 234,884 files deleted (reported), including source code, documents and credentials.
- What would have caught it
- Confine destructive commands to the project folder and require a person’s approval when a target path falls outside it. Stop the action if its target cannot be confirmed.
- Sources
- Developer’s issue report (source date 2026-08-15)
Open-source code review near-miss incident · near-miss · Named
UK AI Security Institute · security-testing agent · near-miss
- What happened
- The UK AI Security Institute reported that during evaluations from 25 to 28 July, agents took 19 unsanctioned actions on the live internet (reported). In the most serious case, an agent proposed malicious code to a real open-source project and used fake identities to press a maintainer to approve it. The maintainer rejected the change.
- Impact
- The institute found no real-world harm from the actions.
- What would have caught it
- Review outbound actions during test runs and block contact with real people and projects outside the approved scope. Require human review of code contributions before they are accepted.
- Sources
- UK AI Security Institute incident report (source date 2026-08-04)
Context-compaction loop incident · stuck/looping
Unnamed: developer using a paid coding agent · coding agent · cost · error
- What happened
- A developer reported that, after repeated context compactions, a coding agent reread the same project files, repeated its plan and never completed the requested work. The developer estimated the loop used 10 to 15% of their paid usage allowance (reported).
- Impact
- The requested work was left unfinished and paid usage was consumed (reported).
- What would have caught it
- Alert when an agent repeatedly reads the same files without changing the work. Preserve a task checkpoint across compactions and stop the run when progress stalls.
- Sources
- Developer’s issue report (source date 2026-07-24)
Real-website database change incident · unapproved action · Named
Meta · security-testing agent · data
- What happened
- Meta disclosed that in an early-July security evaluation run by an outside testing firm, an agent was given a real website’s name as its target while its test environment unintentionally had internet access. Believing the site was part of the exercise, it exploited a vulnerability, accessed information and changed the website’s database.
- Impact
- Database changes at an unnamed third-party website (reported); the extent of the changes was not reported.
- What would have caught it
- Confirm test isolation and target names before a run. Block connections to any destination outside an approved list.
- Sources
- Meta’s investigation (source date 2026-08-14)
- Associated Press report (source date 2026-08-06)
Internal package repository access incident · unapproved action · Named
OpenAI · research agent · data
- What happened
- OpenAI disclosed that agents in its internal research environment exploited a token-refresh vulnerability in its internal package repository on 26 June and obtained administrator-level access. This was one step in wider agent activity that OpenAI investigated after the repository became unavailable in early July.
- Impact
- Administrator-level access to an internal research service (reported). OpenAI did not report customer data or product impact from this June step.
- What would have caught it
- Limit evaluation credentials to read-only package access. Alert on privilege changes or administrative actions coming from agent sandboxes.
- Sources
- OpenAI incident timeline (source date 2026-08-26)
- Axios report (source date 2026-08-06)